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LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
OF CORPORATIONS
VINCENT P. HALEY*
HE RELATIVELY recent, but increasing, development of
programs for corporate political activity- indicates the awareness
of businessmen and corporate management that corporations should, and
do, participate in political activities. However, the law regulating means
by which corporations may legally take positions on political matters
is extremely underdeveloped, with little precedent available to counsel
desiring to advise how corporate funds may be used for such activity.
In an effort to delineate the areas in which a corporation may
engage in political activity, the following discussion is an analysis of
the law, with emphasis on federal statutes, governing that activity
by a corporation, giving consideration to the history, purpose andjudicial interpretation of such law. Specific conclusions based on such
analysis appear at the end of this article.
Probably the most important area of corporate political activity
is that which is designed to affect matters before the electorate - the
election of candidates or referenda upon certain legislation or ques-
tions - as opposed to activity aimed at matters not directly decided at
any election, such as legislation. Thus, for the purposes of the following
discussion, "political activity" is deemed to fall into two broad cate-
gories: (1) activity affecting elections, and (2) activity affecting legis-
lation. So called "political education" - activity affecting governmental




The pertinent text of Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act2 is as follows:
It is unlawful for... any corporation organized by authority
of any law of Congress to make a contribution or expenditure in
* LL.B., 1959, Villanova University School of Law, member of Pennsylvania
Bar Association.
1. See Grossett, Lumb, Wood, The Role of the Corporation in Public Affairs:a Panel, 15 Bus. LAW. 92 (1959) ; Comment, Corporate Political Affairs Programs,
70 YALj L.J. 821 (1961).
2. 18 U.S.C. 610.
(593)
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connection with any election [at which the President or Vice
President or member of Congress] ... are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or
for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or
receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
Every corporation . . . which . . . [violates] this section
shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director...
who consents . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both; and if the violation was
willful, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
Some pertinent definitions are as follows :'
'Contribution' includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance,
or deposit of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract,
promise, or agreement to make a contribution, whether or not
legally enforceable;
'Expenditure' includes a payment, distribution, loan, advance,
or deposit of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract,
promise, or agreement to make. an expenditure, whether or not
legally enforceable;
'Person,' or 'whoever', includes . . . a corporation.
Political contributions by "whoever" enters into certain contracts
(generally for rendition of services or supplies) with the United States
are also prohibited. They are prohibited during the period of negotia-
tion and performance of the contract.4 There are no reported cases
on this section.
As to publication or distribution of political statements, it is
provided that :'
Whoever willfully publishes or distributes . . . any card,
pamphlet, circular, poster, dodger, advertisement, writing, or other
statement relating to or concerning any person who has publicly
declared his intention to seek [Presidential or Congressional
office] . . . in a primary, general, or special election, or convention
of a political party . . . which does not contain the names of the
persons . . . and corporations responsible for the publication or
3. 18 U.S.C. 591.
4. 18 U.S.C. 611. This provision is known as the Hatch Act. Its legislative
history indicates that corporations are not covered by this prohibition. See Farr,
Political Contributions by Corporations in Federal Elections, 19 Bus. LAW. 789,
792 (1964).
5. 18 U.S.C. 612. The only reported case under this section is United States v.
Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.C.N.D. 1961), a prosecution against an individual under
this section, and holding, on a motion to dismiss, that the section does not violate
the first amendment.
[VOL. 9: p. 593
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distribution . . . and the names of the officers of each such . . .
corporation, shall be fined....
While there are no reported corporation cases under this section,
it is interesting to note that in commenting on sections of a state statute
similar to those above (although "expenditures" by a corporation were
not proscribed), the Maryland Supreme Court stated in dictum that
the state statute unmistakably declared by implication that a corpora-
tion may publish and distribute campaign literature if it contains the
name of the corporation and the names of its officers.' However, the
implicit permission in the federal statute for a corporation to make
such an expenditure in a campaign for a federal office conflicts with
the prohibition of Section 313.
It is readily apparent that the real deterrent to corporate political
activity is Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. It will be noted
that it refers to elections involving federal officials only. Further
reference herein to "the statute" will be to Section 313 unless other-
wise indicated.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
As a means of combatting the increasing exercise of political
influence by large aggregations of wealth, the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1907 prohibited corporations from making "money contribu-
tions" in connection with federal elections. In 1925 the Act was
amended to change "money contributions" to "contributions," and in
1943 labor organizations were included within its coverage for the
duration of the war. Labor unions avoided this interdiction by influenc-
ing federal elections with indirect contributions to political campaigns,
such as by printing pamphlets, or by advertising and broadcasting,
rather than with direct contributions to candidates or parties. The
unions made what they called "expenditures," not "contributions."
This was thought by some to be a loophole in the Act, and in 1947
Congress enacted Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act which amended
Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act so as to place labor unions
permanently within its scope and to prohibit "expenditures" as well as
contributions in connection with federal elections. The 1947 amend-
ment also extended the prohibitions of Section 313 to primaries, con-
ventions and caucuses. For a more detailed history of the statute, see
United States v. U.A. W. 7 and United States v. Painters Local Union.8
6. Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946).
7. 352 U.S. 567, 570-83, 77 S.Ct. 529, 530-37 (1957).
8. 79 F. Supp. 516, 519-21 (D. Conn. 1948).
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The legislative history of this statute indicates that it has two
principal purposes :'
(1) to prevent undue influence on federal elections which cor-
porations, and more recently labor unions, are capable of exercising
through liberal financial contributions; and
(2) to protect those shareholders or union members who do not
have the same political views as the corporate or union officials who
control their money in the form of corporate funds or union dues.
The scope and applicability of Section 313 is difficult to determine.
What did Congress intend? Where is the line between lawful and
unlawful contributions and expenditures? It seems clear that any con-
tribution by a corporation directly to a candidate or to a political party
would be unlawful if made in an election year. But what if such a
contribution to a political party or committee were made in a non-
election year? Would it be "in connection with" any election or any
priimary, political convention or caucus which was held to select candi-
dates? And what is the effect of the added prohibition against an
'expenditure," which apparently was thought unnecessary until labor
unions were brought within the interdiction of Section 313?
Specific indications of congressional views concerning these and
other questions as to the scope and meaning of the section are found
in the Senate debate when the 1947 amendment was under considera-
tion."0 This amendment placed the section in substantially the same
form as it exists today. Opponents of the amendment raised a number
of questions concerning its effect on different kinds of corporate and
labor union activities. Its supporters, principally the late Senator Taft,
answered these questions.
The general objective of the amendment was to plug an apparent
loophole by making it clear that indirect political contributions, in the
guise of expenditures, as well as direct contributions are unlawful,
and to subject labor unions to the same prohibitions to which corpora-
tions had been subjected."
In response to questions concerning applications of the proposed
amendment to the publication of political endorsements in union news-
papers and periodicals, Senator Taft repeatedly expressed the view that
it would apply if the periodical or newspaper was supported by funds
derived from union dues.'" A corporation which used a house organ,
9. See 40 CONG. Rgc. 96 (1924); 65 CoN. Rsc. 9507 (1924); SSN. RsP. 101,
79TH CONG., 1ST SEss. (1945) p. 24; 93 CONG. Rlc. 6436-41 (1947). Note that
'protection of union minority members may be afforded under International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784 (1961).
10. 93 CoNG. Rc. 6436-47 (1947).
11. 93 CONG. Rzc. 6436, 6439 (1947).
12. 93 CONG. Rtc. 6436, 6437, 6440 (1947).
[VOL. 9: p. 593
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distributed to employees, to try to elect or defeat a political candidate
would, in the Senator's view, be violating the law.13 However, compare
United States v. C.I.O.,'4 discussed below.
But he explained that the section would not apply to newspapers
or other publications of a corporation or union if the publications were
supported by subscriptions and advertisements, even if the publications
contained political statements, since there would not be any contribu-
tion or expenditure of corporate or union funds. Likewise, the sale of
such publications to employees or union members would not be objec-
tionable, if they were voluntary buyers. The giving away of corporate
or union owned periodicals containing political endorsements, and not
selling them for their money's worth, would be unlawful."5
An association, such as a trade association consisting of corporate
members, could not publish political endorsements in an organ sup-
ported out of membership dues and could not otherwise incur any
expenditure in respect to any election. Even if the member corporations
did not contribute funds primarily for political purposes, but the associa-
tion used such funds for such a purpose, it was stated that the member
corporations would be violating the law.' 6 In this connection the trade
association was compared to the former PAC (Political Action Com-
mittee) of the C.I.O. If the trade association or PAC got its funds
from corporations or from unions, there would be a violation; but not
if the trade association, like PAC, were not a corporation and got its
contributions from individuals, like PAC.'" Union political activity
is discussed below.
The mere publication of the voting records of members of
Congress in a union periodical supported out of union dues (and this
should also apply to a corporate periodical) or the broadcasting of
such information on a news program sponsored by a corporation would
not be unlawful unless such reports were so colored as to amount to
an actual contribution to a particular candidate or party.'"
The purchase of political advertising or of radio broadcast time
for a political speech out of corporate or union funds would be a
violation.' 9 But compare United States v. U.A.W., 20 United States v.
Painters Local Union,2' and United States v. Anchorage Central Labor
Council,2 2 discussed below, involving such activity by unions.
13. 93 CONG. lRc. 6440 (1947).
14. 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948).
15. 93 CONG. I c. 6437, 6440 (1947).
16. 93 CONG. Rnc. 6438 (1947).
17. 93 CONG. Rtc. 6439 (1947).
18. 93 CONG. Rtc. 6447 (1947).
19. 93 CONG. Rvc. 6439, 6440, 6447 (1947).
20. 352 U.S. 567, 77 S.Ct. 529 (1957).
21. 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
22. 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961).
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The congressional debate repeatedly emphasized that whether or
not a contribution or expenditure was in connection with a federal
election is a question of fact. Questions concerning applicability of the
proposed amendment to the expression of political views by corporate-
sponsored radio commentators or by newspapers indirectly subsidized
through corporate advertising caused Senator Taft to take the position
that in each case the particular circumstances would be controlling and
that there would be questions of degree in borderline cases which should
be left to the courts.23
This legislative comment, while helpful as some indication of the
scope of Section 313, must be considered in light of the available
judicial interpretation of the statute.
INTERPRETATIONS BY THE COURTS
Opportunity for judicial answers to some of the questions con-
cerning the section have been presented to the courts, but the answers
are not in agreement.
There are only nine judicial opinions which consider Section 313
of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, involving only six cases. There
are two Supreme Court opinions reversing District Court holdings,
one Court of Appeals opinion reversing a District Court, and three
separate District Court opinions. Most of the decisions deal with
sufficiency of the indictment under Section 313 (as opposed to the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence), and all of the reversals have
been because of differing interpretations of the section as applied to the
particular indictment.
In only one of those six cases was a corporation involved in the
facts; the other cases involved alleged violations of the section by
unions. However, since the statute by its terms proscribes the same
activity by corporations and labor unions, and was so intended by the
legislature," it is important that the labor union cases also be con-
sidered for the courts' views of the statute.
United States v. U.S. Brewers' Ass'n" arose under the earlier
provision applicable to corporations only and to "money contributions."
The association (a corporation) and others were indicted for conspiring
to violate the statute then in effect. The purpose for which the alleged
"money contribution" was to be used is not explained in the court's
opinion. On a motion to quash the indictment, the statute was chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds, principally that it was not within
23. 93 CONG. Ric. 6439 (1947).
24. 93 CONG. R c. 6436, 6439 (1947).
25. 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
[VOL. 9: p. 593
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I
the power of Congress to enact, that it was void as a criminal statute
because of vagueness and uncertainty, and that it violated the first
amendment by attempting to prohibit or restrict freedom of speech and
of press in the discussion of candidates and political questions. The
court rejected these contentions and denied the motion. As to freedom
of speech and of the press, the court merely stated, without elaboration:
The section itself neither prevents, nor purports to prohibit,
the freedom of speech or of the press. Its purpose is to guard elec-
tions from corruption, and the electorate from corrupting influences
in arriving at their choice.26
In disposing of the argument that the statutory words "money
contributions" were vague and uncertain, it is perhaps significant to
note that the court stated:
Whether, in any given case, an expenditure by a corporation
should be construed as 'a money contribution in connection with
any election,' within the spirit, intent, and meaning of the act,
may become a question for the court or jury in the light of all the
circumstances of the case.2 (Emphasis added.)
The court obviously felt that certain kinds of corporate expendi-
tures, other than direct contributions to a candidate or party, were
prohibited by the Act.
In the five cases which follow, the courts have been concerned
with the prohibition against any "expenditure" by a labor union in
connection with elections.
The first of these situations was the case of United States v.
C.I.O.28 C.I.O. President Philip Murray wrote an editorial favoring
one and opposing another candidate for Representative in Congress
from Maryland, and caused the editorial to be published in the CIO
News, a union paper, and circulated it to members in the Maryland
Congressional District. The publication was paid for with general-
tunion funds.
The District Court for the District of Columbia29 dismissed the
indictment, holding Section 313 to be an unconstitutional abridgement
of freedom of speech, press and assembly. The Government had con-
ceded that these freedoms were abridged, but only incidentally, which
it claimed was permissible under the congressional power to control
elections. The Court stated that even though a minority of union mem-
bers might be opposed to the candidate supported, that did not constitute
26. Id. at 169.
27. Ibid.
28. 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948).
29. 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1948).
SUNM=ER 1964]
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such a clear and present danger to the public interest as would justify
abridgement of the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, affirmed the dis-
missal, but on the grounds that the indictment did not set forth a
violation of the statute. The majority of the Court found that the
indictment did not allege any expenditures for "free" distribution of the
paper to those not entitled to receive it:
We do not read the indictment as charging an expenditure
by the C.I.O. in circulating free copies to nonsubscribers, non-
purchasers or among citizens not entitled to receive copies of the
'CIO News,' as members of the union.80
It is our conclusion that this indictment charges only that the
CIO and its president published with union funds a regular
periodical for the furtherance of its aims, that President Murray
authorized the use of those funds for distribution of this issue in
regular course to those accustomed to receive copies of the periodi-
cal and that the issue with the statement [of Mr. Murray] . . .
violated Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act.
. . . We do not think Section 313 reaches such a use of
corporate or labor organization funds.3' (Emphasis added.)
In holding that the expenditure was not prohibited, the Court was
motivated by a desire to avoid the constitutional question, stating (in
language significantly applicable to a corporation and its views on
either issues or candidates) that:
If Section 313 were construed to prohibit the publication, by
corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their
affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or
customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the
adoption of measures, or the election to office of men espousing
such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to
its constitutionality.3 2
The Court further explained that:
Members of unions paying dues and stockholders of corpora-
tions know of the practice of their respective organizations in
regularly publishing periodicals. It would require explicit words
in an act to convince us that Congress intended to bar a tradejournal, a house organ or a newspaper, published by a corporation.
from expressing views on candidates or political proposals in the
regular course of its publication. It is unduly stretching language
to say that the members or stockholders are unwilling participants
in such normal organizational activities, including the advocacy
30. 335 U.S. 106, 111, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1352 (1948).31. Id. at 123-24, 68 S.Ct. at 1358.
32. Id. at 121, 68 S.Ct. at 1357.
600 [VOL. 9: p. 593
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thereby of governmental policies affecting their interests, and the
support thereby of candidates thought to be favorable to their
interests.3 3 (Emphasis added.)
The concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge took the position that
Section 313 clearly was intended to cover the described activity, and
that the section must be held unconstitutional as an abridgement of first
amendment guarantees. The minority pointed out that freedom of
speech, press and assembly are essential to a fair electoral process, as
without them the electorate is deprived of information; that if it is an
evil for organized groups to have unrestricted freedom to make expendi-
tures for publicizing their political views and information supporting
them, it does not follow that a complete prohibition of that right is
necessary; and that the restriction of Section 313 is not limitation or
regulation but a prohibition.
Within two months of the Supreme Court's decision in CIO,
Section 313 was before the courts again. In United States v. Painters
Local Union,34 a union and its president were charged with expending
union funds to pay the cost of an advertisement in a commercial news-
paper of general circulation, and the cost of a special public radio
broadcast, advocating the defeat of certain persons in connection with
a convention to be held to select candidates for a coming federal election.
Upon a motion to dismiss the indictment, the District Court, in a
comprehensive and able opinion, sustained the constitutionality of
Section 313. The CIO case was distinguished as involving expendi-
tures to publish an issue of a weekly union periodical and to distribute
it to those regularly entitled to receive it.
Upon appeal from a conviction, however, the Court of Appeals
reversed 5 and held that this expenditure was not prohibited by Section
313, relying on the CIO case. The court noted that the expenditures
amounted to $111.14 for the newspaper advertisement and $32.50 for
the radio broadcast, and stated:
It seems impossible, on principle, to differentiate the scope
of . . . [CIO] from . . . [this case]. It is hard to imagine that
a greater number of people would be affected by the advertisement
and broadcasting in the present case than by publication in the
union periodical dealt with in the CIO litigation. In a practical
sense the situations are very similar, for in the case at bar this
small union owned no newspaper and a publication in the daily press
or by radio was as natural a way of communicating its views to its
members as by a newspaper of its own.
33. Id. at 123, 68 S.Ct. at 1357-58.
34. 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd., 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
35. 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
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In each instance, it seems unreasonable to suppose that the
members of the union objected to its policy in criticizing candidates
for federal offices. In the CIO case this was thought to be true
because the publication was a 'normal organizational activity.' . . .
In the case at bar, the expenditures were authorized by a vote of
the union members at a meeting duly held.8 6
The following dictum of the District Court in Painters Local
is noteworthy:
The Act does not restrict any exercise of free speech, press or
assembly which can be accomplished without expense to a labor
organization. Thus a labor organization, just as freely as a cor-
poration, is still left with unrestricted liberty to speak and publish,
and even to electioneer in federal elections, through its officers and
its multitudinous members and friends insofar as they are willing
to speak, write and print without special recompense from the,
organization. Such material may lawfully be publicized even at
incidental expense to the organization in organizational periodicals
for distribution to its members, as was held in the C.I.O. case, and
if without expense to the organization by the public press and by
public broadcasting stations for the benefit of the general public.
Indeed, insofar as such publicity material is found to be of suffi-
cient public interest to be newsworthy, there is every practical
assurance that it will be published and broadcast without expense
to the organization.37
Such an interpretation of the statute is probably correct, and it
would allow corporate officers to give statements to the press for publi-
cation, if the press wished to publish them. However, it should be noted
that such a practice could be attacked as an indirect political contribu-
tion or expenditure by the corporation which pays the officer's salary.
Such an attack would probably be sustained if it could be shown that a
certain part of the salary, or other special recompense, was paid for
making such statements (or engaging in any other political activity).,8
In United States v. Constr. and General Laborers Local Union,3 9
it was held that a labor union's payments to three employees who
devoted a considerable portion of their time to political activities, some
of which activities, such as registration of voters and taking voters -to
polls, were for the general benefit of all those who were candidates of
either party, and some of which were devoted exclusively to political
36. 172 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1949).
37. U.S. v. Painters Local Union, 79 F. Supp. 516, 523 (D. Conn. 1948).
38. Compare Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 788, 64 S.Ct. 195 (1943) ; United States v. Constr. and General Laborers
Local Union, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951). (Both cases discussed below.)
39. 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
602 [VOL. 9: p. 593
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss4/2
LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
interests of one candidate for Congress, were not contributions or
expenditures within the meaning of Section 313.
The court touched upon the question raised under the Painters
Local Union case, as to the possibility that a corporation could be
charged with making an indirect expenditure when one of its salaried
officers makes a political statement or speech. In support of its con-
clusion that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to the situation
before it, the court noted that if the statute was construed so as to
be applicable:
[T]hen any political activity of any person on the payroll of
a labor organization, from its president to janitor, would render
that Union and its principal officers liable, if such persons devoted
any appreciable time in support of . . . [or in opposition to a
candidate for federal office]. If . . . [the] president of a labor
organization should draw a salary while making a speech in sup-
port of or in opposition to any candidate for federal office, or if
any expenses during such time were paid by a labor organization,
such an activity would raise a serious question as to whether or
not the labor organization and its officers might not be prose-
cuted. . . The same would be true of any corporation which
permitted one of its employees while on its payroll to spend a few
hours hauling voters to a place of registering, to vote, or to engage
in any other type of political activity."'
In the second Supreme Court interpretation of Section 313,
United States v. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,1 (the UA W case),
it was held, in a 6-3 opinion, that a violation of Section 313 was stated
in an indictment which charged a labor union with having used union
dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence
the electorate to select certain candidates for Congress in connection
with the 1954 elections. The Court refused to pass on the constitutional
issues, ruling that that was not necessary to a decision and that
they could not be decided until after a consideration by the court below
and after an adjudication on the merits.
To deny that such activity, either on the part of a corporation
or a labor organization, constituted an 'expenditure in connection
with any [federal] election' is to deny the long series of con-
gressional efforts calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on
federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who
exercise control over large. aggregations of capital .... [I]t was
to embrace precisely the kind of indirect contribution alleged
40. Id. at 876.
41. 352 U.S. 567, 77 S.Ct. 529 (1957).
SUM-M, ER 1964]
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in the indictment that Congress amended § 313 to proscribe
'expenditures.' 4
2
In distinguishing the CIO case the Court stated:
Thus, unlike the union-sponsored political broadcast alleged
in this case, the communication for which the defendants were
indicted in C.I.O. was neither directed nor delivered to the public
at large. The organization merely distributed its house organ to
its own people. The evil at which Congress has struck in Sec. 313
is the use of corporation or union funds to influence the public
at large to vote for a particular candidate or a particular party.43
(Emphasis added.)
In avoiding the constitutional questions, the majority noted that
allegations of the indictment might not be proved at the trial. The
Court then suggested four questions to be resolved upon subsequent
trial, "not to imply answers to problems of statutory construction, but
merely to indicate the covert issues that may be involved in this case.' 44
These questions of the Court present at least some of the factors
involved in a determination of whether there has been a violation.
They are as follows:
[W]as the broadcast paid for out of general dues of the union
or may the funds be fairly said to have been obtained on a volun-
tary basis? Did the broadcast reach the public at large or only
those affiliated with appellee? Did it constitute active electioneer-
ing or simply state the record of particular candidates on economic
issues? Did the union sponsor the broadcast with the intent to
affect the results of the election ?
It has been reported that on remand of the UA W case the union was
acquitted by a jury, principally because of the District Court's charge
made on the questions of source of funds and active electioneering.46
The dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas in the UA W case felt
that the statute as applied violated the first amendment rights of free
speech and freedom of assembly, irrespective of the answers to the
questions suggested by the majority.47
When the UAW case was originally before the lower court, the
indictment was dismissed on the grounds that it failed to state a
violation of the statute.48 That court found that the case was parallel
42. Id. at 585, 77 S.Ct. at 538.
43. Id. at 589, 77 S.Ct. at 540.
44. Id. at 592, 77 S.Ct. at 542.
45. Ibid.
46. Lane, Analysis of the Federal Law Governing Political Expenditures by Labor
Unions, 9 LAB. L.J. 725 (1958).
47. 352 U.S. 567, 595-96, 77 S.Ct. 529, 543-44 (1957).
48. 138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
[VOL. 9: p. 593
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to Painters Local Union, and relying on the Second Circuit's opinion
in that case held that the union had not made an expenditure on behalf
of a political candidate. In view of the Supreme Court's opinion in the
UA W case, the Painters Local Union case, insofar as it found the
indictment insufficient, is practically overruled. There is at least sub-
stantial doubt as to its authoritative weight. The only distinction, if
there is one, is that in the Painters Local Union case, the union was
small, the expenditures were trifling and communication by a newspaper
advertisement and a commercial radio broadcast was the "natural way"
to communicate with its members.
Thus, it is not strange to find that the next case, which is very
similar to the fact situations in UAW and Painters Local, dealt with
the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, rather than sufficiency of
the indictment. In United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council49
an association of 26 local labor unions was indicted for sponsoring
political television programs which were intended to influence both
union members and non-union members. In holding that the govern-
ment's evidence did not establish a violation of the statute, the court
emphasized two important facts. First, the particular broadcast in-
volved was paid for by the association largely from special "TV con-
tributions" to the council by member unions for the purpose of financing
not only this program but for the entire series of programs conducted
over a period of three years. Each member union decided by a vote
of its membership whether, and how much, it should contribute. Thus,
the contributions were voluntary. Second, the media used in the
broadcast was maintained by the union in the regular course as the
only means the union had or the council had, or could afford, to
communicate with its members. The evidence was that this cost would
be considerably less than trying to get out a newspaper to all the
members of the 25 member unions. Therefore, the fact that the broad-
cast was communicated to the general public as well as union members
did not bring the activity clearly within the statute because the media
was used in the regular course of the union activities upon voluntary
contributions by the unions for such purpose.
Thus, we have the few available judicial interpretations of the
statute.5" While those cases lend very little specificity to what can and
cannot be done by a corporation, they at least provide what case law
49. 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961).
50. Another union case, believed to be unreported officially, held that the Act
does not bar a union's support of federal political candidates with funds derived from
a portion of union dues that members, by signing cards, voluntarily designated as
available for that purpose. United States v. Warehouse Workers Local 688, 29 U.S.L.
Week 2202, Oct. 26, 1960 (E.D. Mo. 1960).
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background there is for advising on the legality of any particular
political activity by a corporation.
Besides the Brewers' Association case, probably the only other
reported federal case involving corporate political activity is Egan v.
United States. 1 Provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act prohibit political contributions (the word expenditure is not in-
cluded) by registered public utility holding companies. 2 In this case,
Egan, president of such a company, was convicted of conspiracy to
violate that Act and the corporation was convicted of conspiracy and
of actual violation. For use in making political contributions, a secret
(i.e., not recorded on the books) cash fund of money belonging to the
corporation was created by means of cash rebates from attorneys
employed by the corporation, from contractors, suppliers, insurance
brokers and cash refunds from padded expense accounts of officers of
the corporation. Also, Egan was given a $1,500 additional salary from
a subsidiary corporation, which he used for making political contribu-
tions. These were rather obvious violations, once discovered, and the
appeal dealt principally with the elements of the crime of conspiracy.
However, there was no argument that the salary to Egan was an
"expenditure" and not a "contribution," by the corporation. Such an
argument probably would have failed, since the funds actually were
finally contributed to candidates or parties and Egan was merely a
conduit for the corporation.
In all of the decisions involving Section 313, the courts have
been concerned with constitutional problems in its enforcement. Before
a summary or conclusion is attempted, it is thus appropriate to at least
briefly consider the constitutional issues.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The power of Congress to regulate political activities in connection
with federal elections is generally recognized under the Constitution."
In Newberry v. United States,54 the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
was held unconstitutional insofar as it attempted to regulate and control
primaries for election to the Senate. But that decision was in effect
overruled by United States v. Classic,55 which held that Congress has
power to regulate a primary, as well as a general election, where the
51. 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788, 64 S.Ct. 199 (1943).
52. Public Util. Holding Co. Act of 1935 § 33, 49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. 791 (h)
(1935).
53. U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 4; art. 11, § 1.
54. 256 U.S. 232, 41 S.Ct. 469 (1921).
55. 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941).
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primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery
for federal office.
Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act has been con-
stitutionally attacked principally on two grounds. First, that it abridges
the first amendment rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly.
Second, that it offends the fifth and sixth amendments in that it is
too vague and indefinite to furnish a reasonably ascertainable standard
of guilt.
As to the latter contention, it appears that if the issue should
reach the Supreme Court, that Court will follow the reasoning in the
learned opinion of the District Court in Painters Local Union. The
District Court there held that by the use of the words "contributions
or expenditures in connection with" elections, Congress meant to
prohibit expenditures for the purpose of influencing the result of
elections, and that as so construed the section is not fatally vague.5 6
It will be noted that the Supreme Court, in the UAW case, in effect
adopted this construction.5 7
The first mentioned contention, regarding violation of first amend-
ment rights, is the one which merits the most serious consideration.
Such an argument can also be made against the validity of state corrupt
practices acts (discussed below), for the liberty of speech and of the
press which the first amendment guarantees against abridgement by
the Federal government is within the liberty safeguarded against state
action by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 8
The first amendment argument has been most ardently presented
in the labor union cases. As has been noted, the dissenting opinion in
both cases before the Supreme Court felt that Section 313 was uncon-
stitutional as abridging first amendment freedoms. The majority in the
CIO case expressed doubt as to its constitutionality if it were construed
as applicable in that case. The District Court in the CIO case had
held the section unconstitutional, although the District Court in the
Painters Local Union case held it constitutional. In the Brewers'
Ass'n case, the District Court merely stated, with little discussion,
that the former version of the section did not prevent nor prohibit
freedom of speech or of the press. Note that only this latter case involves
a corporation, as opposed to a union, asserting the right to free speech.
It seems highly probable that Section 313 will be held unconsti-
tutional as an unjustified- interference with the right to freedom of
speech if interpreted to prohibit the stating of political views by a labor
organization. So far, such as interpretation has been avoided. It
56. 79 F. Supp. 516, 526 (D. Conn. 1948).
57. See quotes from the Court's opinion, supra, notes 43 and 45.
58. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
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should be noted, however, that a labor organization may receive
greater or different constitutional protections than a corporation. A
preliminary question then is whether a corporation is a person (albeit
an artificial person) entitled to freedom of speech. The dissenting
opinion in the CIO case had this to say:
The argument for applying and sustaining the section in its
presently attempted application has gone largely upon the assump-
tion that it would be valid as applied to similar corporate publica-
tions, excepting possibly the regular press. The assumption is one
not justified by any decision of this Court, which has the final voice
in such matters. There are of course important legal and economic
differences remaining between corporations and unincorporated
associations, including labor unions, which justify large distinc-
tions between them in legal treatment. But to whatever extent this
may be true, it does not follow that the broadside and blanketing
prohibitions here attempted in restriction of freedom of expression
and assembly would be valid in their corporate applications.
Co'rporations have been held within the First Amendment's pro-
tection against restrictions upon the circulation of their media of
expression. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 ...
It cannot therefore be taken, merely upon legislative assump-
tion,... that restrictions upon freedoms of expression by corpora-
tions are valid . . . . [T]hose matters cannot be settled finally
until this Court has spoken. 9
The Gros/ean case,6" cited by the dissent, held that a newspaper
corporation's first amendment rights were protected against state action.
since the corporation is a "person" within the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Many cases have been
decided since then which have sustained claims by corporations that
their freedom of speech had been or would be abridged, and most of
the cases seem to take for granted that a corporation may assert
such a claim."
While indictments for corporate contributions directly to a political
candidate or party may not be subject to the first amendment defense, the
freedom of speech afforded to a corporation can be expected to prevail in
a clash with Section 313 if the latter is interpreted to prohibit a corpora-
tion from using its own funds to make known its own views, formulated
by proper corporate action, about political candidates or issues.
59. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 154-55, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 1373 (1948).
60. 297 U.S. 233, 79 S.Ct. 1362 (1936).
61. The movie censorship cases are typical. See, e.g. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 79 S.Ct. 1362 (1959) ; Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 74 S.Ct. 286 (1954). See also Comment.
Freedom of Speech and the Corporation, 5 VILL. L. REv. 377 (1959). Cf. United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 736 (1954), discussed infra, note 66.
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UNION ACTIVITY
Since labor unions have been involved in the most recent cases
concerning Section 313, and because of their known political activity
despite the apparent prohibitions of the statute, it will be informative
to discuss briefly the activities of labor organizations since those court
decisions. The AFL-CIO has organized political committees, cur-
rently called COPE (Committee on Political Education), which operate
both on national and state levels. COPE relies on voluntary contribu-
tions from the membership of member unions, and the national and
multi-state committees report contributions and expenditures for federal
campaigns to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as required by
law of all political committees. COPE is made up of local and state
committees of AFL-CIO members, and a national committee made up
of the AFL-CIO Executive Council and officers of member inter-
national unions. COPE is voluntarily financed by dollar drives, as
were its predecessors, the CIO's PAC (Political Action Committee)
and the AFL's LLPE (Labor's League for Political Education). These
committees, especially the national one and other large ones, publish
brief newspapers (usually weekly) for their affiliates and anyone else
who subscribes. They analyze bills before Congress, keep union mem-
bers informed of the voting records of Congressmen, and prepare and
broadcast radio and television programs giving union views of the
news. Between elections "education programs" are conducted to inform
union members on legislative issues, actions of Congress and voting
records of Congressmen on certain legislation. It is felt by union
officials and their lawyers that since in these educational programs
none of the union's general funds are used in behalf of any particular
candidate, the expenses of the program may be borne by general union
funds. They also feel that general union funds can be used on behalf
of state candidates (in states where labor organizations are not pro-
hibited by statute from making political contributions) and for state
registration drives.6" The labor union cases previously discussed also
illustrate various types of union activity.
LOBBYING
Lobbying, the practice of contacting federal or state legislators,
or other persons influential in the legislative process, for the purpose
of influencing action or inaction on legislation or government policies,
62. See Bicks and Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finances, 28
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 975 (1953) ; Brief for United States in the UAW case. See also The
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, January 23, 1964, p. 10, col. 1.
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is a form of political activity even though the electorate is not directly
involved. Many persons, including corporations or associations of
which they are members, maintain paid lobbyists to present their views
to members of the executive and legislative branches of government.
Certain aspects of lobbying are regulated by the Federal Regula-
tion of Lobbying Act,63 passed in 1946.. The Act requires designated
reports to Congress (disclosing the source and amounts of contribu-
tions received and the recipient, purpose and amounts of expenditures
made) from every lobbyist.64 It also requires that any person who
engages himself for any consideration for the purpose of attempting
to influence passage or defeat of any legislation must register with the
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, and must file
similar reports disclosing amounts received and expended, and the
recipient and purpose of the amounts expended."5
In United States v. Harriss,6 6 a prosecution against a corporation
and two individuals charged with failing to make the reports required
by the Act, the Government contended that the Act requires a person
to report his expenditures to influence legislation even though he does
not collect or receive contributions for that purpose. The District
Court had dismissed the case on grounds that the Act was unconsti-
tutional. The Supreme Court, in a five to three decision, reversed and
remanded, holding that the Act, as construed by the Court, was not
too vague and indefinite and did not violate the first amendment.
The Court held that the Act referred only to, lobbying in its
commonly accepted sense, that is, to direct communication with mem-
bers of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation. The Court
construed the disclosure provisions (Sections 264 and 267) as applicable
only to "persons" within Section 26667 and stated that there are three
prerequisites to application of Section 266:
(1) the "person" must have solicited, collected or received con-
tributions;
(2) one of the main purposes of such "person" or of such contri-
butions must have been to influence the passage or defeat of legislation
by Congress; and
(3) the intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have
been through direct communication with members of Congress.
68
Therefore, a corporation may incur expenditures for lobbying pur-
poses and, so long as it does not meet all of those prerequisites, it need
63. 60 Stat. 839-42 (1946), 2 U.S.C. 261-70 (1958).
64. 60 Stat. 840 (1946), 2 U.S.C. 264 (1958).
65. 60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. 267 (1958).
66. 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808 (1954).
67. 60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. 266 (1958).
68. 347 U.S. 612, 623, 74 S.Ct. 808,'815 (1954).
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not be concerned with the requirements of the Lobbying Act, although
its paid lobbyist will probably have to comply with its provisions.
The dissenting opinion in Harriss felt that the Act was unconstitu-
tionally vague and that it could not be saved by construction. It will
be noted that the majority, in holding that the Act was not a prohibition
but merely a reasonable requirement of disclosure of lobbying activities
and thus not violative of the freedoms of speech, press and the right
to petition the Government, made no distinction between the corporate
and individual defendants in this regard.
Thus, the Lobbying Act permits a corporation to lobby for or
against legislation affecting its interests. True, in some instances a
corporation will have to make certain reports to Congress and possibly
register as a lobbyist. H6wever, in the sense that ordinary lobbying
is a political activity, it is not prohibited by the Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act. This conclusion can usually be explained by stating that the
expenses of lobbying are not incurred "in connection with any" federal
election, but the line becomes very thin when there is direct communi-
cation with a member of Congress at a time when he is seeking re-elec-
tion. Also, in this connection, the existence of the right to lobby and
petition for certain types of legislation seems inconsistent with a denial
of the right to endorse and support a candidate who favors such
legislation. The CIO case would seem to permit a corporation to
exercise the latter right, on constitutional grounds, as long as the
corporation did not evidence such support by direct contributions but
by statements in the corporation's regular periodicals.
STATE LAW QUESTIONS
Generally speaking, the question of legality of contributions as a
matter of corporation law will be determined from a consideration of
the corporation's powers and purposes. Most general or business cor-
poration statutes do not contain express provisions concerning political
contributions, and therefore it is a question of implied power of the
corporation and the implied authority of its board of directors. There
are very fevw cases or text writings on the question. Two corporation
law authorities feel that political contributions are beyond the power
of the usual business corporation, at least in the absence of a statutory
or charter provision." These two authorities cite a total of only two
cases: People v. Moss" and McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill
Co.7 No other cases on point have been found.
69. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 85 (rev. ed. 1946); 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
or LAW OP CORPORATIONS § 2939 (rev. ed. 1950).
70. 187 N.Y. 410, 80 N.E. 383 (1907).
71. 30 Mt. 239, 76 Pac. 194 (1904).
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The Moss case involved a habeas corpus proceeding by an officer
of the New York Life Insurance Company who was being detained
on a charge of larceny for using corporate funds for a political con-
tribution to the Republican National Committee in 1904 (prior to
statutes banning corporate contributions). It was held that no prima
facie case of larceny had been established, the court noting that although
the purpose for which the money of the company was used was foreign
to the chartered purposes of the corporation, that alone did not make
it criminal.
The McConnell case was a stockholder's action against the directors
for an accounting for improper expenditures, one of which was for
political purposes. The directors were held liable to the corporation,
as contributions for political purposes were considered to be outside
of the purposes for which the corporation was created, such a purpose
not being enumerated in the statute.
It appears that these two cases rest basically on the proposition
that directors and officers cannot give away corporate property without
the consent of the shareholders. Even the power of corporations to
make contributions for charitable, scientific or educational purposes was
a serious issue prior to the passage of a specific statutory power to
make such contributions by most states. 2 It is noteworthy that in
the CIO case the Supreme Court brushed aside the argument that the
type of expenditure there involved would be without the knowledge of
union members or corporate shareholders. 73
The power of a corporation to make political contributions, if not
stated in its charter, can, it is submitted, be found in statutory grants
of "incidental powers." For example, the Pennsylvania Business Cor-
poration Law provides that a corporation shall have power "to have
and exercise all of the powers and means appropriate to effect the
purpose or purposes" for which it is organized. 74
Corporations certainly have a legitimate interest in legislation
and policies, such as taxes, foreign or domestic trade regulation and
labor laws, which affect or regulate corporate activity designed to
effectuate the corporate purpose. There is implied recognition of this
interest in federal and state regulation of lobbying by corporations as
well as by individuals. If there is an interest in certain types of legis-
lation or government policies, it follows that there exists an interest
72. See, e.g. 8 DtL. CODE ANN. § 122 (9) (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2852-
302 (16) (1958).
73. 335 U.S. 106, 123, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1357-58 (1948), quoted in text supra, at
note 33.
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2852-302 (14) (1958).
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in the public officer (or candidate) who supports or opposes that legis-
lation or policy. Having in mind, also, the extensive political activity
of labor unions, which almost forces corporate management to con-
sider countervailing activity, it seems reasonable to conclude that an
expenditure for a lawful political purpose is within the power of a
corporation and the authority of the Board of Directors, especially if
some kind of business benefit to the corporation-can be expected. A
brewery corporation's benefit in opposing local dry laws is an example.75
The question of general corporation law is secondary in the many
states76 (approximately 33) which have express statutory provisions
purporting to prohibit political contributions by corporations, and
because of the federal ban. In addition, numerous states have statutes
relative to lobbying activity by corporations.77
If a state has no corrupt practices act applicable to corporations,
the legality of corporate political activity in those states, in the absence
of application of the federal statute, would be controlled by general
corporation law, presumably the law of the place of incorporation.
The state corrupt practices acts vary somewhat in phraseology,
but their obvious intent is to keep corporations out of politics, although
they generally do not prohibit "expenditures." Frequently they do not
apply to labor organizations. Direct corporate contributions to political
parties or candidates are generally forbidden in express language, and
it is not unusual to find a provision prohibiting corporations from
publishing or distributing any literature or statements about candidates
unless such literature or statement contains the name of the corporation
and, perhaps, the names of its officers. Beyond that, the statutes are
much less than clear, and there is an extreme lack of court interpreta-
tion of these statutes.
Many of the considerations mentioned in connection with the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act also apply here: whether expenditures
are prohibited and if so, to what extent; whether the statutes apply to
support of proposals as well as to support of candidates; and whether
the state statute applies when an alleged contribution is made in con-
nection with an election at which both federal and state officers are
75. See State v. Fairbanks, 187 Ind. 648, 115 N.E. 769 (1917) (brewery corpora-
tion contribution to influence the success of a township anti-liquor proposition) ; State
v. Terre $aute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248, 115 N.E. 773 (1917) (implies that a dry
law was being voted on). These cases deal with alleged violations of and the scope
of a state corrupt practices act, and do not consider the question of corporate power
to make the contribution.
76. See C.C.H., CORP. LAw GUIDE, §§ 5775, 6510, for citations to the various
statutes.
77. See, c.g., MD. CoDE ANN. art. 40, §§ 5-14 (1951) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20
to 30-28 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-10-6110 (1955).
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being elected. The constitutional issues of vagueness and freedom of
speech are also present. 78
The state lobbying acts generally follow the scheme of the federal
act, although in some states both the person who employs the lobbyist
and the lobbyist must register.
CONCLUSIONS
The effects of the federal prohibition against "contributions" and
"expenditures" are by no means settled, either as to a corporation or a
labor organization. The statute is deceptively simple, yet it has, in
effect, been rewritten by the Supreme Court in the CIO case which
held that a certain activity, apparently clearly within the express terms
and Congressional intent of the statute, was not prohibited. In all of
the years that prohibition against corporate contributions has been on
the books only one prosecution has resulted and its outcome has not
been reported. 79 The prohibition against union activity has been on the
books for over 17 years, yet there have been only five prosecutions
against labor unions for its violation, ° and no convictions. Thus, on
the basis of the present meager authority, it is difficult to generalize
or to make particular conclusions, especially as to corporations.
It has been claimed that the corporate ban has hardly dented
corporate influence on federal elections; that the effect of the prohibition
has been to obscure the continuing influence of corporate wealth in
elections since large gifts are made by corporate officials and their
families which exert the same influence as direct contributions by the
corporation; and that Section 313 does not restrict corporate contribu-
tions to trade associations or national business groups whose activities
benefit candidates. 8 ' The latter groups receive corporate funds either
through direct contributions or through the purchase by the corpora-
tions of large quantities of literature.8 2
The concern for dissenters has ignored many devices that give
corporate interests a powerful political voice. 3  Thus corporations
maintain paid lobbyists. Another manner in which corporate funds
78. See People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195 (1916), where the state
corrupt practices act was held constitutional as not depriving a corporation of freedom
of speech and press, on the ground that these freedoms were not guaranteed to an
artificial person.
79. United States v. U.S. Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
80. If the Warehouse Workers Local case, supra note 50, is included, there have
been six prosecutions.
81. See Bicks and Friedman, op. cit. supra, note 62, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 975 (1953);
The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, January 23, 1964, p. 10, col. 1.
82. Compare remarks of Senator Taft in Senate debate, discussed above, text at
note 16; and see 18 U.S.C. § 608(b), infra note 84.
83. Bicks and Friedman, op. cit. supra, note 62, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 975 (1953).
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may be used to further political goals which some shareholders may
oppose is by the "public interest" or "good-will" advertisement. These
advertisements are said to enable business interests to give support to
a candidate or party by paraphrasing speeches or slogans or by present-
ing views as to legislative policies (such as the corporate advertisements
for or against the federal excise tax, right to work laws or privately
owned utilities). If such business expenses are allowed as tax deduc-
tions, part of the expense is passed along to the Government. Another
method of making a corporate contribution has been to purchase "good-
will" advertisements in party journals which may be published to mark
some occasion such as a state or county political committee dinner."4
On the basis of this study of the available authority, some general
conclusions or suggestions are as follows. The emphasis is on the
federal statutes, but, of course, the possibility of the application of
state law to a specific situation must be considered.
It is clear that a corporation may not contribute corporate funds
to a candidate for federal office or to his political committee or party.
Loans of corporate assets without reasonable compensation, such as
making available products manufactured or facilities owned by a cor-
poration, are also prohibited.
In view of the UA W case, a corporation cannot expend corporate
funds to pay for commercial television or radio political broadcasts
which reach the public at large and constitute "active electioneering"
with an "intent to affect the results" of a federal election. The same
is probably also true with respect to political advertisements in news-
papers of general circulation. However, such activity may ultimately
be held within the protection of the first amendment.
Expenditures by a corporation for various forms of political educa-
tion are permissible, although the outer limits of "political education"
are as yet undefined. On the basis of the CIO case, it seems clear
that a corporation may express its political views on issues or candi-
dates in a regularly published house organ going to its shareholders
or customers. A more liberal and, it is felt, more acceptable view of
the CIO case would be that regular corporate periodicals or newspapers
financed from corporate funds can legally contain such political material
and can be distributed to those accustomed to receiving copies, whether
84. See The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, January 23, 1964, p. 10, col. 1. How-
ever, the latter method appears to be at least a technical violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(b) which subjects to fine or imprisonment or both:
Whoever [which includes a corporation] purchases or buys any goods, com-
modities, advertising, or other articles . . . the proceeds of which . . . directly or
indirectly inures to the benefit of or for any candidate for . . . [a federal office]
or any political committee or other political organization engaged in furthering ...
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they be shareholders, employees, customers or even subscribers. Such
publication and distribution would not involve an attempt to reach the
"public at large." Thus, shareholders, employees and customers could
be advised about economic and political questions of current importance
and about candidates. In the case of employees, it would appear desir-
able to have the material mailed to their homes so that the entire
family might read it.
Apparently, an association of corporations could also publish such
material for distribution to its corporate members, which in turn could
distribute to its shareholders, employees and customers. This would be
so even though the member corporations have contributed corporate
funds to the association, because the publication remains "in the family"
as in the CIO case.
Corporations may make expenditures (which would include giving
time off with pay to employees) for the purpose of urging shareholders,
employees and customers, and possibly the public at large, to register,
to vote, and to take a more active part in politics. Here, there is no
intent to influence the result of an election, no favoring of one candidate
over another. Giving time off with pay to an employee who is a
candidate or working for a candidate or party is naturally in a different
category, since the compensation subsidizes the favored political party.
A corporation may use its facilities for soliciting voluntary con-
tributions from shareholders or employees to a fund to be donated or
used for political purposes, especially (but not only) when the con-
tributor is able to designate the political organization which will receive
his contribution. The analogy here is to the Anchorage Central Labor
Union case, and the practice of labor organizations in using a local
union's facilities to solicit contributions via dollar drives. However,
such a practice does not appear to be as practical where a corporation is
involved as it is with a union local.
Using corporate funds to purchase tickets to fund-raising dinners
for the benefit of candidates or their parties would be a violation. The
result should be different, however, where the funds raised by the
dinners are for non-political purposes, such as for the benefit of some
charitable organization, even though sponsored by a political party.
Corporations sometimes purchase advertising space in souvenir
programs or other publications published by political parties or can-
didates. Where the advertisement promotes the corporation and not
a candidate - i.e., the corporation or its products are actually adver-
tised in the publication, at a reasonable cost - there should be no
violation because the corporation has donated nothing, having received
fair value in advertising for its expenditure.
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LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
Contributions made in a non-election year, or post-election con-
tributions to help eliminate campaign fund deficits, arguably are not
made "in connection with" any election, convention or caucus within
the meaning of the statute, nor with an "intent to affect the results of
the election" as stated in the UAW case. However, since such con-
tributions are, indirectly at least, used in such manner by the recipient,
they technically are prohibited. A danger in making contributions to
reduce deficits is that the recipient may begin to rely on obtaining
them from the corporation, thus raising the implication that the cor-
poration has made a prohibited "promise ... to make a contribution"
or expenditure.
Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act does not ex-
pressly prohibit corporate contributions or expenditures in connection
with state and local elections, but this may be implied when federal
offices are filled at the same election. State law is also important here,
of course. Labor unions have reportedly taken the position that con-
tributions to state elections are not prohibited, even where federal
officers are elected at the same time."5 Such a course of action for a
corporation, as well as for a labor union, does not appear to be wise,
unless reliance is placed on the lax enforcement of the section.
The question of whether Section 313 is meant to prohibit expendi-
tures for the purpose of persuading voters on propositions or legisla-
tive issues (such as elections involving right to work laws) as well as
on candidates for office has not been decided by the federal courts.
For state authority that it does not, see De Mille v. American Federa-
tion of Radio Artists.8" Such a conclusion appears correct unless the
vote on the proposition is cast in the same election at which federal
officers are to be elected.
When a proposition or legislative issue is not to be decided by
the electorate, expenditures designed to bring the corporation's views
before the public are probably permissible. Lobbying, to bring the
corporation's views to the legislators, is also permissible when the
federal and applicable state statutes are observed.
It is probable that Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act will be held unconstitutional if interpreted to prohibit corporate
expenditure for the purpose of bringing its views on candidates or
-political issues before the general public.
As to state law, corporate contributions or expenditures for lawful
political purposes should be considered as within a corporation's power
where some kind of business benefit to the corporation can be found.
85. See Garrett, Corporate Contributions for Political Purposes, 14 Bus. LAW.
365, 374 (1959).
86. 31 Cal. App. 2d 169, 187 P.2d 769 (1947).
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There is a striking lack of authority on this point. The state corrupt
practices acts apply to domestic or foreign corporations, and probably
apply to any election, whether for federal or state officers, held within
the state. The same first amendment questions apply to these states
acts as apply to the federal act.
In the last analysis, it must be remembered that the question of
the extent to which a corporation can participate in political activity
has three aspects, since consideration should be given to federal statutes,
state corporation law and state statutes. Meager authority on all three
of these aspects makes prediction difficult and any degree of certainty
almost impossible. It is hoped that the material and suggestions
presented here will be helpful in formulating advice to the corporate
client with respect to any proposed political activity.
There is undoubtedly a peril to the public interest when federal
and state candidates depend on large contributors, but large amounts
of money are consumed by modern campaigns and battles over political
issues. The desire of corporations and unions to contribute a part of
such funds, directly or indirectly, is sure to continue as long as govern-
ment and politics so directly affect their interests. The various corrupt
practices acts are not an adequate solution to the problem.
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